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Chapter 1 
It Takes More Than House Calls: 
Organizing to Win 
with a Comprehensive 
Union-Building Strategy 
Kate Bronfenbrenner and Tom Juravich 
Until recently, some national and local union leaders still argued that labor 
should circle the wagons and take care of existing members rather than 
spend scarce resources on organizing nonunion workers. Today those voices 
have largely been silenced by the hard numbers of labor's dramatic decline. 
As expressed in the platform of the new AFL-CIO leadership slate, the 
American labor movement must "organize at an unprecedented pace and 
scale." The question unions face today is no longer whether to make or-
ganizing a priority but how that can best be achieved. 
Yet it is important to recognize that organizing has become increasingly 
difficult. Under the crushing weight of weak and poorly enforced labor 
laws, rabidly antiunion employers, and an increasingly hostile political and 
economic climate, it is no wonder that so few American workers overcome 
the threats, fears, and delays and go on to actually organize a union and 
bargain a first agreement. Matters are only made worse when labor leaders 
are told time and again by their supposed friends in government and acade-
mia that American workers are no longer interested in unions but see a 
more viable and less threatening alternative in management-proffered par-
ticipation programs. 
Faced with an increasingly hostile environment, the labor movement has 
begun to focus its energy on the one element of the organizing process that it 
controls—union strategies and tactics. For some organizers, this has meant 
organizing outside the traditional NLRB process through broader commu-
nity-based and industry-based organizing campaigns. For others, this has 
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meant critically analyzing union organizing strategies used during the 
NLRB election process, from targeting to winning elections to bargaining 
first agreements. 
Unfortunately, although considerable macro-level research documents the 
magnitude of labor's decline, surprisingly little micro-level research looks 
intensively at the organizing process itself, particularly the importance of 
union strategies and tactics. In part, this is because many industrial relations 
researchers are not convinced that union tactics play a significant role in 
determining election outcomes. Some researchers, such as William T. Dick-
ens (1983), believe that union tactics are entirely reactive, determined solely 
by management tactics. Other researchers may believe that union tactics 
matter but are unable to include them in their research models because they 
either have a limited understanding of the range of union organizing tactics 
or lack access to union campaign data. Thus, most industrial relations 
research on private-sector organizing continues to focus primarily on the 
election, unit, and employer variables easily accessible in NLRB databases.1 
Bronfenbrenner's study of private-sector NLRB certification election and 
first-contract campaigns that took place in 1986 and 1987 provided the 
first comprehensive analysis of the most effective union organizing strategies 
(Bronfenbrenner 1993 and 1997). The findings suggest that union success 
in certification election and first-contract campaigns depends on using an 
aggressive grassroots rank-and-file strategy focused on building a union and 
acting like a union from the very beginning of the campaign. Although the 
research confirmed the prevalence of egregious employer behavior in the 
private sector and the effectiveness of that opposition in thwarting union 
efforts to win elections and bargain first contracts, it also showed that 
unions can overcome even the most intense opposition when they run ag-
gressive bottom-up campaigns. 
In the almost ten years since the elections Bronfenbrenner addressed in 
her study, dramatic changes have taken place in the organizing arena. Many 
of the largest unions in the country have shifted resources into organizing 
and have revamped their training and recruitment programs for organizers, 
putting more focus into conducting more aggressive and more strategic 
campaigns. Other unions have turned to the AFL-CIO Organizing Institute 
for help in screening and recruiting new organizing staff. But despite these 
efforts, NLRB election win rates remain below 50 percent and fewer than 
one-third of the more than 300,000 private-sector workers who attempt 
to organize each year end up being covered under collective bargaining 
agreements. Clearly it is time to reevaluate union campaigns to determine 
1. For a detailed review of the literature on union tactics, see Bronfenbrenner 1993 and 
Lawler 1990. 
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whether unions have made significant changes in how they organize and, if 
so why those changes have not resulted in greater organizing success. 
This chapter examines data on 165 NLRB certification election cam-
paigns conducted in 1994 to track the changes that have occurred in union 
and employer behavior since Bronfenbrenner's study. In so doing we test 
the hypothesis that unions make significant organizing gains only when they 
utilize a comprehensive union-building strategy. Simply throwing money 
and staff at campaigns is not enough to overcome employer resistance and 
worker fear. Nor does any individual organizing tactic—whether sophisti-
cated media campaigns, stockholder actions, or a blitz house calling of 
every worker in the unit—guarantee success. House calling, in particular, 
has in some quarters been offered as the silver bullet, the panacea for all 
types of organizing campaigns. 
But to be successful in today's hostile climate with today's workers, it 
takes more than just house calls. We suggest that unions will continue to 
fail in organizing if all they do is graft individual innovative tactics onto 
more traditional organizing approaches. Further, we hypothesize that these 
tactics are truly effective only when they are integrated into a comprehen-
sive rank-and-file approach to organizing that focuses on the use of personal 
contact, leadership development, and a combination of aggressive and cre-
ative internal and external pressure tactics. 
Private-Sector Organizing in 1986-87 
Bronfenbrenner's 1986-87 study (1993 and 1997) was designed to evaluate 
the influence of several factors that contribute to union success or failure in 
certification election campaigns. Through a survey of the lead organizers in 
261 NLRB campaigns, Bronfenbrenner was able to determine which union 
tactics had the most positive impact on election outcomes while controlling 
for the impact of election environment, organizers5 background, bargaining 
unit demographics, and employer characteristics and tactics. A summary of 
the findings from the original study is presented in the first three columns 
of table 1.1. 
Perhaps the most striking finding of Bronfenbrenner's study was that 
union tactics as a group play a greater role in explaining election outcome 
than any other group of variables, including employer characteristics and 
tactics, bargaining unit demographics, organizers' background, and election 
environment. This suggests that union strategies not only matter in de-
termining election outcome but that they may matter more than many other 
factors. 
For the labor movement, this means that union strategies and tactics can 
make a significant difference in whether unions win or lose elections, even 
TABLE 1.1 Summary of NLRB Election Campaigns, 1986-87 and 1994 
1986-87 NLRB Elections 1994 NLRB Elections 
Sample 
proportion 
or mean 
.43 
.47 
.35 
.34 
.66 
138 
.46 
.27 
.28 
.14 
6.31 
.46 
.22 
.71 
.33 
.40 
.79 
.30 
.18 
.30 
.15 
— 
.17 
.10 
.42 
— 
Proportion 
or mean 
for wins 
1.00 
.65 
.75 
.39 
.61 
105 
.54 
.39 
.34 
.21 
5.72 
.52 
.12 
.67 
.22 
.36 
.79 
.35 
.19 
.23 
.18 
— 
.19 
.13 
.37 
— 
Percentage 
win rate" 
.43 (.00) 
NA 
NA 
.48 (.39) 
.39 (.48) 
NA 
NA 
.59 (.36) 
NA 
.64 (.39) 
NA 
.49 (.38) 
.22 (.47) 
.40 (.50) 
.28 (.49) 
.38 (.45) 
.43 (.42) 
.51 (.39) 
.37 (.44) 
.32 (.47) 
.53 (.41) 
— 
.47 (.42) 
.52 (.41) 
.37 (.46) 
— 
Sample 
proportion 
or mean 
.42 
.49 
.27 
.28 
.72 
178 
.39 
.19 
.28 
.12 
8.74 
.38 
.25 
.87 
.64 
.24 
.76 
.28 
.26 
.24 
.11 
.29 
— 
.07 
.50 
.27 
Proportion 
or mean 
for wins 
1.00 
.71 
.65 
.46 
.54 
141 
.43 
.28 
.31 
.13 
8.35 
.42 
.20 
.81 
.45 
.23 
.71 
.27 
.25 
.26 
.17 
.28 
— 
.03 
.33 
.20 
Percentage 
win ratea 
.42 (.00) 
NA 
NA 
.70 (.31) 
.31 (.70) 
NA 
NA 
.61 (.37) 
NA 
.45 (.41) 
NA 
.46 (.39) 
.33 (A3) 
.39 (.62) 
.29 (.64) 
.40 (.42) 
.39 (.51) 
.40 (.42) 
.40 (.42) 
.45 (.41) 
.67 (.39) 
.40 (.42) 
— 
.17 (.44) 
.28 (.56) 
.32 (.45) 
OUTCOME 
Election outcome 
Percentage union vote 
First contract outcome 
UNIT BACKGROUND 
Sector: Service 
Manufacturing 
Number of eligible voters 
Percentage women in unit 
Unit at least 75% women 
Percentage people of color in unit 
Unit at least 75% people of color 
Average wage 
Other units of employer organized 
Unit different than petition 
EMPLOYER TACTICS 
Outside consultant 
Five or more captive-audience meetings 
Five or more company letters 
Supervisor one-on-ones 
Discharges for union activity 
Discharges not reinstated before election 
Employer gave wage increases 
Employer used layoffs 
Unilateral changes in benefits 
Leaders promoted out of unit 
Employer ran media campaign 
Employer assisted antiunion committee 
Employer held social events 
TABLE 1.1 Summary of NLRB Election Campaigns, 1986-87 and 1994 (cont. 
1986-87 NLRB Elections 1994 NLRB Elections 
Sample 
proportion 
or mean 
.07 
— 
— 
.21 
4.15 
.21 
.10 
.23 
.36 
.28 
5.26 
.22 
.18 
— 
.53 
.15 
.12 
.03 
.02 
.16 
.11 
.27 
2.12 
.03 
Proportion 
or mean 
for wins 
.04 
— 
— 
.20 
3.74 
.15 
.13 
.34 
.45 
.41 
5.36 
.20 
.23 
— 
.57 
.23 
.15 
.04 
.05 
.19 
.14 
.36 
2.69 
.06 
Percentage 
win rate3 
.22 (.44) 
— 
— 
.41 (.43) 
NA 
.32 (.45) 
NA 
.62 (.37) 
NA 
.61 (.35) 
NA 
.39 (.43) 
.52 (.40) 
— 
.46 (.39) 
.64 (.39) 
.53 (.41) 
.50 (.42) 
.10 (.41) 
.50 (.41) 
.52 (.41) 
.56 (.37) 
NA 
1.00 (.41) 
Sample 
proportion 
or mean 
.33 
.09 
.42 
.38 
4.87 
.39 
.12 
.44 
.58 
.39 
11.16 
.39 
— 
.17 
.21 
— 
.56 
.41 
.13 
.30 
.12 
— 
3.24 
.15 
Proportion 
or mean 
for wins 
.23 
.04 
.29 
.31 
4.23 
.30 
.14 
.57 
.64 
.39 
12.99 
.46 
— 
.20 
.28 
— 
.58 
.38 
.19 
.30 
.16 
— 
3.49 
.30 
Percentage 
win rate3 
.30 (.48) 
.20 (.44) 
.29 (.51) 
.33 (.47) 
NA 
.32 (.48) 
NA 
.54 (.32) 
NA 
.42 (.42) 
NA 
.50 (.37) 
— 
.50 (.40) 
.54 (.38) 
— 
.43 (.40) 
.39 (A3) 
.61 (.38) 
.43 (.41) 
.58 (.39) 
— 
NA 
.67 (.38) 
EMPLOYER TACTICS (cont.) 
Employee-involvement plan in effect 
Employee involvement set up after petition 
Employer used bribes 
Management change after petition 
Number of employer tactics used 
Employer used more than five tactics 
UNION TACTICS 
Percentage on committee 
Representative committee 
Percent house called 
50% or more house called 
Number of small-group meetings 
Ten or more small-group meetings 
Rank-and-file volunteers did house calls 
Ten or more rank-and-file volunteers 
70% or more surveyed one-onrone 
Bargaining committee before election 
Solidarity days used 
Union held rallies 
Union held job actions 
Community-labor coalitions used 
Union used media 
Dignity, fairness primary issues 
Total number rank-and-file tactics used 
Union used more than five rank-and-file tactics 
a
 Number in parentheses is the percentage win rate when the tactic or characteristic did not occur. 
NA = Not applicable. 
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in a climate of intense employer opposition, economic decline, and weak 
public support. It also means that industrial relations research models that 
exclude union tactics fail to capture one of the most important elements of 
the organizing process. 
The study showed that unions are most likely to win certification elec-
tions when they run aggressive and creative campaigns utilizing a grass-
roots, rank-and-file-intensive strategy, building a union and acting like a 
union from the very beginning of the campaign. Thus, campaigns in which 
the union focused on person-to-person contact, house calls, and small-
group meetings to develop leadership and union consciousness and to inoc-
ulate workers against the employers' antiunion campaigns were associated 
with win rates that were 10 to 30 percent higher than traditional campaigns 
that primarily used gate leafleting, mass meetings, and glossy mailings to 
contact unorganized workers. These results do not imply that something is 
inherently wrong with union leaflets and mailings but, rather, that personal 
contact is necessary to build support for a union and counteract an em-
ployer campaign. 
Bronfenbrenner's study also found that unions were more successful 
when they encouraged active rank-and-file participation in and responsibil-
ity for the organizing campaign, including developing a large rank-and-file 
organizing committee representative of the different interest groups in the 
bargaining unit. The importance of rank-and-file participation extends be-
yond representation on the committee to involvement in internal and exter-
nal pressure tactics that build solidarity and commitment to the union and 
compel the employer to run a less aggressive campaign. 
The findings of the 1986-87 study also showed that it is essential that 
the union develop a long-range campaign strategy that incorporates build-
ing for the first contract into the original organizing process. Election win 
rates were more than 20 percentage points higher in units in which the 
union conducted bargaining surveys, selected the bargaining committee, 
and worked with the rank and file to develop proposals before the election 
rather than waiting until after the election to prepare for the first-contract 
campaign. 
The issues the union focuses on during the campaign also are very im-
portant in determining election outcome. Unions that focused on issues 
such as dignity, justice, discrimination, fairness, or service quality were 
associated with win rates that were nearly 20 percentage points higher than 
those that focused on more traditional bread-and-butter issues, such as 
wages, benefits, and job security. 
Finally, unions were also more successful when they developed a culture 
of organizing that permeated every activity and structure of the union. This 
included a serious commitment of staff and financial resources to organiz-
ing, the involvement of the international in local campaigns, and the train-
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ing, recruitment, and effective utilization of rank-and-file volunteers from 
already-organized bargaining units. 
Bronfenbrenner found that individual "rank-and-file intensive" tactics 
were associated with win rates 10 to 30 percentage points higher than win 
rates in campaigns that did not use these tactics. She also found that when 
these tactics were included in a regression equation controlling for the in-
fluence of employer tactics and characteristics and unit and election envi-
ronment variables, many were associated with as much as a 3 percent 
increase in the percentage of votes received by the union and with as much 
as a 10 percent increase in the probability of winning the election. Given 
that so many NLRB election campaigns are lost by only a few percentage 
points, these results strongly suggest that unions organizing in the private 
sector could significantly improve their win rates if they used all or most of 
these rank-and-file-intensive tactics. 
Unfortunately, the findings also show that in 1986 and 1987 only a very 
small number of unions were using a comprehensive union-building strategy 
in their certification election campaigns. As shown in the first column of 
table 1.1, fewer than one-third of those unions surveyed had representative 
committees, house called the majority of the members of the unit, held ten 
or more small-group meetings, or focused on dignity and fairness as the 
primary issues. Even fewer had solidarity days, established a bargaining 
committee before the election, or used such tactics as forming community-
labor coalitions or holding rallies, job actions, or media campaigns. 
Most striking of all, only 3 percent of the unions ran comprehensive cam-
paigns in which they used five or more of the rank-and-file-intensive union-
building strategies. In the small number of campaigns in which a more 
comprehensive strategy was used, however, unions won every election. This 
compares with a 41 percent win rate in those units in which the unions used 
fewer than five rank-and-file-intensive tactics. Further, controlling for the in-
fluence of employer characteristics and tactics and unit and election environ-
ment variables, the probability of the union winning the election increased by 
10 percent for each additional rank-and-file-intensive tactic the union used.2 
1994 Data and Research Methods 
As part of his recent study, described in part IV of this volume, on the 
impact of employee-involvement programs on union organizing campaigns, 
2. Tactics included in this variable were whether the union had a representative organizing 
committee, house called at least 50 percent of the members of the unit, held ten or more 
small-group meetings, used rank-and-file volunteers from other units to make house calls, had 
solidarity days, established a bargaining committee before the election, surveyed 70 percent or 7 
more of the members of the unit one-on-one about the contract, utilized community-labor 
coalitions, held rallies, used job actions, and focused on dignity and fairness as primary issues. 
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James Rundle surveyed a random sample of lead organizers of two hundred I 
single-union NLRB certification election campaigns that took place in 1994 I 
and involved units with fifty or more eligible voters. The 165 campaigns in I 
his final sample represented approximately one-quarter of all the NLRB I 
elections that took place in units of fifty or more eligible voters in 1994. I 
Although the sample contained a slightly higher concentration of blue-collar 1 
manufacturing units than the election population and underrepresented I 
units with high concentrations of low-wage women and minority workers, I 
overall the sample was representative across unions, industries, regions, and | 
types of bargaining units. I 
In addition to collecting data on employer-initiated employee- I 
involvement programs, Rundle asked the lead organizers a series of ques- f 
tions about the demographics of the bargaining units, employer tactics, and I 
union tactics. Although this information is much more limited in scope than 1 
the election and unit background data collected in the 1986-87 study, it I 
does provide an important opportunity for comparison. 1 
Descriptive statistics were calculated for each of the variables included in I 
the model to capture the nature and extent of union and employer organiz- 1 
ing activities in 1994 and to enable us to make comparisons between those 
findings and the data obtained for 1986-87. In addition, logit analysis was 1 
used to determine whether union tactics variables, both individually and as. J 
a group, had a statistically significant impact on certification election out- I 
comes when controlling for the influence of election environment, bar- I 
gaining unit demographic, and employer tactics variables. 1 
Like Bronfenbrenner's study, this research is based on a theoretical model 1 
that sees election outcome as a function of interacting elements, including 1 
background variables, union and employer characteristics, and union and f 
employer strategies.3 It tests the hypothesis that union success in certifica- 1 
tion elections depends on the utilization of a comprehensive union-building I 
strategy that incorporates personal contact, leadership development, and I 
creative and aggressive internal and external pressure tactics. We hypothe-
size that although some individual union tactics may have a positive impact 1 
on election outcome, significant union gains will depend on a multifaceted, 
comprehensive campaign that utilizes as many rank-and-file-intensive tac-
tics as possible. Union tactics variables in our model include the following: 
having a representative rank-and-file committee;4 house calling of 50 per-
3. For a full description of the theoretical model used in the 1986-87 study, see Bronfen-
brenner 1993:137-81. 
4. A representative committee is defined as a committee that is representative of at least 10 
percent of the eligible voters of the unit and that has at least 10 percent women and/or 10 
percent people of color for any units with at least 10 percent women and/or 10 percent people 
of color. 
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cent or more of the members of the unit; holding ten or more small-group 
meetings during the campaign; enlisting the help of ten or more rank-and-
file volunteers from already organized units during the campaign; holding 
solidarity days, rallies, and job actions; launching media campaigns; utiliz-
ing community-labor coalitions; and conducting a one-on-one contract sur-
vey of at least 70 percent of the members of the unit. When combined in a 
single rank-and-file-intensive union tactics variable, it is hypothesized that 
the probability of the union winning the election will significantly increase 
for each additional tactic the union uses. 
In addition to the union tactics variables, we were able to control for 
election environment, employer characteristics, bargaining unit demograph-
ics, and employer tactics with the following variables: number of eligible 
voters, presence of other organized units, board-ordered or stipulated 
change in the unit from unit for which the union originally petitioned, unit 
at least 75 percent women,5 percentage people of color in the unit, average 
wage in the unit, and number of employer tactics used. The tactics constitut-
ing the employer scale variable include whether the employer used an out-
side consultant, held five or more captive-audience meetings, sent five or 
more antiunion letters to employees, discharged workers for union activity 
and did not reinstate them before the election, enlisted supervisors to cam-
paign one-on-one, gave wage increases, made unilateral changes in benefits, 
laid off workers during the campaign, ran a media campaign, used bribes, 
assisted the rank-and-file antiunion committee, set up an employee-
involvement program after the petition was filed, held social events, and 
made changes in management structure and personnel. 
Results 
Table 1.1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for both the 1986-87 and 
the 1994 studies. What is perhaps most striking is how little the data have 
changed. In the 1990s, as in 1986-87, the win rate in units with more than 
fifty employees continues to average about 43 percent. The percentage 
union vote remains unchanged, and the first contract rate has gone down 
slightly. Although unions continue to enjoy dramatically higher win rates in 
service-sector units than in manufacturing units (70 percent versus 31 per-
cent), most election activity is concentrated in the manufacturing sector. 
Similarly, although win rates have been shown to be significantly higher in 
5. Seventy-five percent women was used rather than a simple continuous percentage women 
variable because previous research by Bronfenbrenner (1993) and by Ruth Milkman (1992) 
found that gender homogeneity has a significant influence on election outcome. Union win 
rates are highest when a clear majority of the unit are women but are higher in all-male units 
than in units with 25 percent to 50 percent women. 
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units in which women and people of color predominate, less than 20 percent 
of the units being organized include a significant majority of either women 
or people of color. The percentage of stipulated versus NLRB- and court-
ordered changes in the bargaining unit is unchanged. 
The data show that unions are attempting to organize slightly larger 
units. Thus, in 1986-87, there were no elections in units with more than 
five hundred eligible voters and the average size of the units in which unions 
won was only 105, whereas in 1994, 5 percent of the organizing campaigns 
in the sample were in units with more than five hundred eligible voters and 
the average number of eligible voters in units in which the union won 
increased to 148. Such an incremental improvement is hardly sufficient to 
stem the tide of labor's decline. 
Employer campaigns have undergone the greatest change, not so much in 
the tactics being used but in the overall intensity. Just as they did a decade 
ago, the overwhelming majority of employers use a broad range of aggres-
sive legal and illegal antiunion tactics, including discharging workers for 
union activity, giving workers illegal wage increases and imposing unilateral 
changes in benefits, conducting one-on-one supervisor meetings with em-
ployees, offering bribes, supporting antiunion committees, holding captive-
audience meetings, establishing employee-involvement programs, holding 
social events, and mailing letters and distributing leaflets. And, just as in 
1986-87, most of these tactics are associated with significantly lower win 
rates. 
Many employers have also increased the use of specific tactics. For exam-
ple, 87 percent of the employers in the 1994 sample used outside consul-
tants as opposed to 71 percent in 1986-87. Similarly, whereas only 33 
percent of employers held five or more captive-audience meetings in 1986-
87, 64 percent held them in 1994, and 33 percent had established employee-
involvement committees, compared with only 7 percent in 1986-87. 
What is most striking about the employer tactics, however, is that 
whereas only 21 percent of employers used more than five aggressive anti-
union tactics in 1986-87, by 1994 that number had jumped to 39 percent. 
Not surprisingly, win rates were significantly lower in units in which em-
ployers used more than five aggressive tactics (32 percent) than in units in 
which five or fewer such tactics were used (48 percent). 
The nature and the intensity of union campaigns have also changed. The 
percentage of campaigns in which the union had a representative organizing 
committee increased from 23 to 44 percent, while the percentage of cam-
paigns in which the union conducted house calls of the majority of the 
members of the unit increased from 28 to 39 percent. Likewise, the average 
number of small-group meetings the union held during the campaigns went 
from 5.26 in 1986-87 to 11.16 in 1994, and the percentage of units in 
which the union held ten or more small-group meetings increased by 17 
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percent. Unions were also much more likely to have solidarity days (56 
percent versus 12 percent), to hold rallies (41 percent versus 3 percent), to 
utilize community-labor coalitions (30 percent versus 16 percent), and to 
conduct job actions (13 percent versus 2 percent) in 1994. With the excep-
tion of house calling of the majority of the members of the unit and holding 
rallies, all these tactics were associated with higher win rates than cam-
paigns in which these tactics were not used. 
Looking more closely at the intensity of the campaigns, however, we find 
that the change has not been very significant. Fewer than half the campaigns 
surveyed had representative committees, ran more than ten small-group 
meetings, actively used rank-and-file volunteers from already-organized 
units, or conducted one-on-one surveys. The average number of rank-and-
file-intensive tactics the unions used was only 3.24, compared with 2.12 in 
1986-87. Contrast this with the number of tactics used by employers, 
which averaged 4.87 in 1994 and 4.15 in 1986-87. 
Most striking of all, in 1994 only 15 percent of the lead organizers 
surveyed ran comprehensive campaigns that used more than five rank-and-
file-intensive tactics. Although this is a fivefold increase from 1986-87, the 
figure still represents an extremely small portion of NLRB campaigns. In 
those 15 percent, however, the win rate shoots to 67 percent, versus only 
38 percent when the unions used five or fewer tactics. 
Clearly, the majority of unions continue to run very traditional campaigns 
that do not involve personal contact, leadership development, and the inter-
nal and external pressure tactics so essential to establishing the rank-and-file 
commitment and support necessary to overcome increasingly aggressive 
employer campaigns. Even when they do use such tactics as house calling, 
small-group meetings, and solidarity days, unions tend to use these tactics 
in isolation, without benefit of a more comprehensive campaign. The ques-
tion then becomes, how does house calling, for example, which is meant to 
be part of a larger grassroots effort aimed at reaching workers one-on-one, 
work in the absence of other tactics, such as forming a representative com-
mittee or using internal pressure tactics or building for the first contract 
during the organizing campaign? 
As we can see from table 1.2, the importance of developing a more 
comprehensive campaign becomes even more apparent when included in 
a logit estimation controlling for the influence of election environment, 
bargaining unit demographics, and employer characteristics and tactics 
variables. Two models were used to estimate the predicted impact of union 
tactics on the probability of the union winning the election. The first model, 
A, includes each individual union tactic. The second model, B, combines 
the individual union tactics into a rank-and-file-intensive scale variable, 
adding one unit for each additional tactic used. 
As predicted, the number of eligible voters, changes in the composition 
TABLE 1.2. Impact of Union and Employer Tactics on Election Outcome, 1994 
Model A Model B 
Independent variable 
Mean or Percentage 
Hypothesized percentage union win 
sign of sample rate Coefficient 
Predicted impact on 
probability of union 
wina Coefficient 
Predicted impact on 
probability of union 
win3 
ELECTION BACKGROUND VARIABLES 
Number of eligible 
voters 
Other units represented 
Unit different than 
petitioned for 
Average wage 
Unit at least 75% 
women 
Percentage minority in 
the unit 
Number of employer 
tactics usedb 
UNION TACTICS 
Model A 
Union had representa-
tive committee 
Union house called 
majority 
Union held ten or more 
small-group meetings 
-
+ 
-
" 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
178 
.38 
.25 
8.74 
.19 
.28 
4.87 
.44 
.39 
.39 
NA 
.46 
.33 
NA 
.61 
NA 
NA 
.54 
.42 
.50 
- 1 . 9 4 1 * * 
.317 
-1 .779** 
- 1 . 6 0 6 * 
1.701** 
1.263 
-4 .209*** 
2.661*** 
-0 .011 
1.392* 
no perceptible impact 
— 
-15% if different 
— 2% for $1 increase 
in average wage 
15% if 75% women 
— 
— 7% for each 
additional tactic 
20% if had represen-
tative committee 
— 
10% if 10 or more 
— 1.568 * no perceptible impact 
.497 — 
-1 .852 * * - 1 6 % if different 
-1 .204 — 
9% if 75% of women 
2.006' 
1.319 * 2% for 10% increase 
in people of color 
-3.897*** -7% for each 
additional tactic 
TABLE 1.2. Impact of Union and Employer Tactics on Election Outcome, 1994 (cont.) 
Model A Model B 
Independent variable 
Mean or Percentage 
Hypothesized percentage union win 
sign of sample rate Coefficient 
Predicted impact on 
probability of union 
win3 Coefficient 
Predicted impact on 
probability of union 
win3 
UNION TACTICS (cont.) 
Model A 
Union used at least ten 
rank-and-file 
volunteers 
Union used solidarity 
days 
Union used rallies 
Union used job actions 
Union used media 
Union used commu-
nity labor coalitions 
70% of voters surveyed 
one-on-one 
Model B 
Number of union 
tactics used 
.19 
3.24 
.50 
.56 
.41 
.13 
.12 
.30 
.21 
.43 
.39 
.62 
.58 
.43 
.54 
NA 
2.153 *! 22% if 10 or more 
1.233 
1.135 
2.228** 
1.836** 
0.054 
1.390* 
— 
— 
24% if job actions 
used 
22% if media used 
— 
12% if surveyed 
3.902*** 9% for each 
additional tactic 
Total Number of Observations 
McFadden's Rho-squared 
2 (log-likelihood) 
Significance levels: * =.10 ** =.05 
165 .42 
= .01 (one-tailed tests) 
.253 
56.638 
.000 ! .17 
38.23 
000: 
a
 Based on partial derivative for statistically significant variable from logit estimations of election outcome with dependent variable win-lose. 
b
 Employer tactics include five or more captive-audience meetings, five or more company letters, supervisor campaigned one-on-one, change in management after the 
petition, company gave wage increases, unilateral change in benefits, employer held social events, company used media, company used bribes, company assisted antiunion 
committee, workers discharged and not reinstated before the election, and employer set up employee-involvement program during campaign. 
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of the unit, and employer tactics were also found to have significant negative 
impact on election outcome. Employer tactics in particular were found to 
affect election outcome dramatically. The probability of the union winning 
the election declined by 7 percent for each aggressive antiunion tactic the 
employer used when the influence of election environment, bargaining unit 
demographics, and union tactics were controlled for. 
The results also provide support for the argument that unions are more 
successful in units with a majority of women and/or people of color. As 
shown in the results for the partial derivatives in model B, the probability 
of the union winning the election increased by 9 percent in units with at 
least 75 percent women and by 2 percent for each 10 percent increase in 
the number of people of color.6 
The results for the individual union tactics variables included in model A 
are quite mixed. Although tactics such as having a representative commit-
tee, using at least ten rank-and-file volunteers, conducting job actions, and 
using a media campaign exhibited a strong positive and statistically signifi-
cant impact on election outcome, other tactics, such as holding ten or more 
small-group meetings and surveying 70 percent of the unit members one-on-
one, exhibited a relatively weak effect (only a 0.10 level of statistical sig-
nificance). The remaining union tactics, including house calling the majority 
of the members of the unit, holding solidarity days, having rallies, and 
forming community-labor coalitions, were not found to have a statistically 
significant positive effect on certification election outcomes. 
Yet when these tactics were combined into a single union tactics variable 
in model B, adding one unit for each rank-and-file-intensive tactic used, the 
number of tactics was found to have a strong positive impact on election 
outcome (statistically significant at 0.001 or better). The results from the 
logit estimation controlling for the influence of election environment, bar-
gaining unit demographics, and employer tactics variables suggest that the 
probability of the union winning the election increases by as much as 9 
percent for each rank-and-file-intensive tactic the union uses. 
These results lend strong support to our hypothesis that whether there is 
a comprehensive union-building campaign that incorporates person-to-
person contact, leadership development, escalating internal and external 
pressure tactics, and building for the first contract is more important in 
determining election outcome than whether the union uses individual tac-
6. The relatively weak results for the percentage people of color variable (not statistically 
significant in model A and significant at only a 0.1 level in model B) may be explained by the 
fact that Rundle's sample underrepresented low-wage manufacturing- and service-sector units, 
in which people of color dominate. This is particularly true of SEIU hospital and nursing 
home campaigns and of UNITE's manufacturing campaigns in the Deep South, which were 
underrepresented because of difficulties in tracking down the organizers in the short time 
allotted. 
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tics. The more union-building strategies are used during the organizing 
campaign, the greater the likelihood that the union will win the election, 
even in a climate of intense employer opposition. Given that the probability 
of the union winning the election is reduced by 6 percent for each aggressive 
antiunion tactic the employer uses and increased by 9 percent for each 
rank-and-file-intensive tactic the union uses, these findings once again sug-
gest that union tactics as a group matter more than employer tactics in 
determining union success in NLRB certification election campaigns. 
Conclusions 
This examination of recent certification elections provides important in-
sights into the state of organizing in the private sector. The findings not only 
suggest directions for further research but provide guidance for the labor 
movement in its revitalization efforts. One of the most fundamental findings 
for both labor activists and scholars is that union tactics and activities 
are central to the organizing process. Although many academics and trade 
unionists traditionally looked only to the deteriorating economic and politi-
cal climate and antiunion campaigns as the determinants of organizing 
outcomes, this study underscores that union tactics matter as much, if not 
more, in determining results. 
The data from 1994 give credence to many voices from the front lines of 
the labor movement who report that employers have intensified their anti-
union efforts. As we have seen, employers have not necessarily adopted new 
tactics, or shifted their behavior in favor of some tactics over others. In-
stead, they have continued to utilize the model honed throughout the 1980s 
and early 1990s but with greater intensity. Despite recent cries for labor law 
reform, our data show only too well the outcome of that effort, as workers 
face greater and greater risks and pay higher and higher costs for simply 
attempting to exercise their right to organize a union in their workplace. 
The data from 1994 provide further support for the finding of the 1986-
87 study that despite the intensity of employer opposition, what unions do 
during organizing campaigns is what matters most. Unions can still win, as 
demonstrated in UNITE's string of victories in manufacturing plants in the 
South, SEIU's success in organizing more than two thousand workers at 
Crouse Irving and Corning Hospitals in upstate New York, or the Team-
sters5 national campaign against Overnite. And, in support of the original 
1986-87 study, we once again have found that the use of a grassroots, 
rank-and-file-intensive, union-building strategy is fundamental in signifi-
cantly raising the probability of winning. Overall, these data suggest that 
the recommitment of the labor movement to organizing is not a futile effort. 
If unions use the right tactics, they can still win, despite the odds. 
This good news is tempered, however, by current union practice in choos-
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ing tactics and running organizing campaigns. Despite increased training, 
staff, and budgets, unions have made only minor improvements in embrac-
ing a more rank-and-file-intensive approach to organizing. The 1994 data 
suggest that the labor movement has been more tied to traditional top-
down, plant gate types of organizing than many have assumed. 
The current data indicate the willingness of many organizers and unions 
to experiment with some grassroots union-building tactics. Clearly, these 
tactics have been discussed and have begun filtering out to front-line orga-
nizers. Yet the approach has been largely piecemeal; organizers have used 
one or two isolated tactics without incorporating them into a more cohesive 
and consistent strategy. Only a handful of campaigns have fully embraced 
a union-building approach, and this is reflected in the overall win rate, 
which continues to hover at about 50 percent. 
Although individual tactics, such as having a representative committee, 
using rank-and-file volunteers, and conducting media campaigns, are im-
portant, our data clearly indicate that the use of individual tactics is not 
enough. The question this piecemeal approach raises is, what does it mean 
to have a representative committee, for example, in the absence of other 
grassroots strategies? Having a representative committee is one thing, but if 
rank-and-file workers are never trained in one-on-one organizing and if 
they are never given an active leadership role in the campaign, then the very 
purpose of developing rank-and-file leadership is defeated. Whether they 
are conducting house calls, organizing job actions, or rallying community 
support, rank-and-file organizing committees are effective in overcoming 
employer opposition or in mobilizing worker support only when they, 
rather than organizing staff, are doing the primary work of building a union 
in their workplace. Individual tactics are not effective when they are used 
in isolation from other union-building efforts. 
Similarly, the quality of the tactics being used also matters. A campaign 
in which every worker receives a house call in a weekend blitz by outside 
organizing staff that is little more than a ten-minute visit to drop off litera-
ture will be much less effective than a campaign in which the union sets up 
small-group meetings with two or three workers at workers' homes, in 
community centers, or in the workplace and workers have an opportunity 
to express their concerns and to be inoculated against the employer cam-
paign, to mobilize for solidarity actions, and, most important, to develop 
leaders for the long haul to come. 
Effecting the kind of sea change in organizing that the new leadership of 
the AFL-CIO has correctly suggested is crucial for survival will take more 
than house calls, coordinated campaigns, volunteer organizers, or the use 
of any individual tactic. It will take an unprecedented commitment of staff 
and resources. It will also take mass industry- and community-based or-
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ganizing that goes far beyond small-scale hot shop by hot shop campaigns. 
As our data also clearly show, effecting such a sea change requires a commit-
ment to a comprehensive grassroots rank-and-file-intensive model and all 
the hard work that entails. Only by making such a commitment will unions 
become truly successful in organizing. 
Given the level of employer opposition, and the likelihood that such 
opposition will continue to intensify until the labor movement has grown 
enough to enact real labor law reform, our research indicates that it is not 
enough to tinker with organizing techniques. To win takes nothing short of 
truly exceptional effort, including an exceptional organization committed 
to building a union from the bottom up. 
In addition to increasing the win rate in individual elections, the use of a 
rank-and-file-intensive model for organizing has several important long-
term benefits. First, if unions are going to organize on a scale unprecedented 
since the 1930s, they need more than just professional organizers. Given 
the recommitment by the labor movement to organizing, discussions have 
occurred concerning the costs of organizing individual workers and the 
astronomical budgets that will need to be committed to organize at the pace 
and scale required. It would be incorrect to suggest that the union-building 
model of organizing is less expensive than more top-down methods. In fact, 
in the short run, it may be more costly. Yet the long-term benefit of this 
grassroots model is that it creates a tremendous capacity for organizing. By 
fully involving rank-and-file members, however, the potential exists to cre-
ate an army of experienced and committed rank-and-file organizers. There 
is no better example of this than UNITE's campaigns in its southern region, 
where recently organized rank-and-file volunteers have played a crucial role 
in organizing plants in neighboring communities. 
Although investing dollars and people in organizing is fundamental to 
jump-start and sustain organizing efforts, the use of rank-and-file union-
building approaches can create an even larger capacity for organizing and, 
in turn, a mass movement of workers. At this point the calculus of what 
organizing will cost changes. From this perspective, the use of a union-
building model does much more than increase the likelihood of winning 
an individual election; it also creates a culture, climate, and capacity for 
organizing in the future. 
But there is more at stake in a grassroots union-building campaign than 
just getting new members and dues payments. Organizing should also not 
be viewed as independent of the other activities of unions and their mem-
bers. Particularly in an antiunion climate, organizing is just the first step in 
creating a strong and viable bargaining unit and local union. The unit must 
get a first contract and over time build an organization with real power in 
the workplace. It not only needs to achieve real dignity, justice, and fairness 
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for its members but it must be ready to stave off the many challenges it will 
face over time. Thus, not only does the union-building approach allow for 
victory, it also creates an opportunity for the union to become strong and 
viable, as workers early in the organizing process gain leadership skills and 
understand the real power associated with their involvement in the union. 
There has been much discussion in the labor movement about moving from 
a servicing to an organizing model; our research suggests that this process 
should begin during the organizing process itself. 
Rank-and-file grassroots organizing strategies are also critical to the de-
velopment of different kinds of unions. Union efforts during organizing 
campaigns to create an active and well-informed rank and file are wasted if 
these workers are squeezed into already existing, service-based organiza-
tions in which staff alone negotiate contracts and handle grievances. Partic-
ularly for the growing number of women and people of color who are 
increasingly involved in organizing campaigns, these traditional structures 
often involve serious obstacles to inclusion. 
Newly organized workers need to be seen as more than just members of 
a special interest group to be accommodated in an existing structure and 
agenda. Especially given the recent lack of union growth, these new mem-
bers—their ideas and issues, their dreams, and their desires—represent the 
future of the labor movement. Their enthusiasm and excitement should not 
be bridled in a structure that has often been perceived as cliquish and 
exclusionary. Instead, these newest members must become central to an 
inclusive and rejuvenated unionism of the 1990s. 
Overall, our research demonstrates that there are indeed no silver bullets 
in organizing. Although some in the labor movement have seen individual 
tactics such as house calling as panaceas, as we have shown, these tactics 
are effective only when used in the context of a broader rank-and-file union-
building approach. Unquestionably, it will take a great deal of hard work 
to move away from a reliance on traditional top-down strategies to the use 
of a more comprehensive grassroots union-building model. Yet, as the his-
tory of organizing in places as diverse as Lawrence, Flint, and Memphis 
have demonstrated, the fruits of this approach are many. More than simply 
organizing new members, rank-and-file-intensive campaigns will allow for 
the rebuilding of the labor movement—not simply individual labor organi-
zations but a mass movement poised to regain its rightful place in society. 
